Paul Ducklin talks to world-renowned cybersecurity skilled Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs, on this fascinating episode, recorded throughout our latest Safety SOS Week 2022.
With regards to combating cybercrime, Fraser really is a “specialist in every part”, and he additionally has the knack of explaining this tough and treacherous topic in plain English.
[ROBOT VOICE: Sophos Security SOS]
PAUL DUCKLIN. Whats up, everyone.
Welcome to the Sophos Safety SOS week.
Right this moment’s subject is: Stopping cyber threats – cease them earlier than they cease you!
And our visitor in the present day is none apart from Mr. Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs.
Now, these of you who’ve listened to SOS Week earlier than will know that I like to explain Fraser as a “specialist in every part”, as a result of his data is not only broad, it’s also extremely deep.
He ticks each cell within the spreadsheet, you would say.
So, Fraser, welcome again to the SOS Week.
I wished to begin by specializing in one thing that goes by the title of LOLBIN, which I consider is brief for “living-off-the-land binary”, which is jargon for software program that’s there already that the cooks love to make use of.
FRASER HOWARD. Precisely that.
DUCK. And the large downside in the intervening time appears to be that the most certainly LOLBIN, or the most certainly pre-installed program that the crooks will dine out on, for need of a greater phrase, is nothing apart from PowerShell, which is constructed into Home windows.
It’s out there on each model of Home windows as quickly as you put in it.
And it’s the medium of administration as of late for Home windows itself.
So how do you reside with out it?
FRASER. Precisely – identical to you described, from the attackers’ perspective, LOLBINs are sensible.
They both deliver their very own knife to the battle, and their knife would possibly look very totally different to every part else that’s on the system…
…or they use a knife that simply occurs to be current on the system within the first place.
And that’s advantageous to the attacker, for apparent causes.
Any safety software program gained’t see some model new, shiny, unknown software immediately being run and utilized in a part of the assault.
However instruments like PowerShell are already there – that’s when the video games start when it comes to making an attempt to work out, “Is it one thing good, or is it one thing unhealthy?”
I want there was a one-line reply to how we detect malicious PowerShell versus benign, however really it’s fairly a fancy scenario.
What precisely is the PowerShell course of doing itself?
On one finish of the spectrum, you would use know-how like, for instance, software management.
And as an admin, you would select: “PowerShell, you shouldn’t be allowed to run in my setting.”
That’s type of a panacea, in case you like, and it could cease PowerShell being abused, however it could additionally break a lot of official exercise, together with the core administration of most Home windows machines in the present day.
DUCK. OK, so software management is Sophos’s title for the power to detect, and optionally to dam, software program that isn’t malware, however {that a} well-informed administrator won’t wish to help of their setting?
FRASER. Precisely.
And it’s not nearly admins and their alternative of “Which software ought to my customers be allowed to make use of?”
It’s about fundamentals.
If you consider safety, what’s one of many issues that we’ve been telling folks for the final 5 or 10 years?
“Patch!”
When you’re an administrator and also you’re permitting anyone to make use of no matter software they need for his or her browser, that’s possibly 5 to 10 totally different browsers that it’s a must to patch.
Truly, for admins, applied sciences like software management allow them to slender that menace floor.
DUCK. However PowerShell… some folks say, “Oh, simply block PowerShell. Block all .PS1
information. Job achieved.”
FRASER. It’s not fairly so simple as that!
DUCK. Might a sysadmin handle with out PowerShell in a contemporary Home windows community?
FRASER. [PAUSE] No.
[LAUGHTER]
I imply, there are coverage choices that they may select to solely permit sure signed scripts, for instance, to be run.
However there’s a complete number of ideas and methods that the attackers know that attempt to bypass these mechanisms as nicely.
Among the older scripting engines… the perfect instance is Home windows Scripting Host – most individuals don’t understand it’s there.
It’s not the one-stop store for admin that PowerShell is, however WSCRIPT
and CSCRIPT
…
…these binaries, once more, are on each single Home windows field.
They’re much more possible to outright block, they usually get abused, once more by malware.
DUCK. So the Home windows Scripting Host consists of issues like JavaScript (not operating in your browser, exterior your browser), and good outdated Visible Primary Script?
FRASER. There’s a complete host of them.
DUCK. Now, Visible Primary script is discontinued by Microsoft, isn’t it?
However it’s nonetheless supported and nonetheless very extensively used?
FRASER. It’s very talked-about with the Unhealthy Guys, sure.
And it’s not simply scripting engines.
I can’t bear in mind precisely what number of binaries are on among the important LOLBIN lists which might be on the market.
With the fitting mixture of switches, impulsively, a binary that you simply would possibly use to handle, for instance, certificates regionally…
…really can be utilized to obtain any content material from a distant server, and put it aside to disk regionally.
DUCK. Is that CERTUTIL.EXE
?
FRASER. Sure, CERTUTIL
, for instance.
DUCK. As a result of that may also be used to do issues like calculate file hashes.
FRASER. It may very well be used to obtain, for instance, base64-encoded executable content material, put it aside regionally, and decode it.
After which that content material may very well be run – as a manner of doubtless getting by way of your internet gateways, for instance.
DUCK. And that will get even worse with PowerShell, doesn’t it?
As a result of you’ll be able to take a base64-encoded string and feed that into PowerShell because the enter script, and it’ll quietly decode it for you.
And you may even put in a command line choice, are you able to not, to say, “Hey, if the consumer stated ‘don’t permit scripts to execute from the command line’, ignore it – I want to override that”?
FRASER. You talked about .PS1
information.
That’s a bodily script file which may exist on disk.
Truly, PowerShell is fairly adept at doing issues filelessly, so simply the command line itself can comprise the whole thing of the PowerShell command.
DUCK. Now, my understanding is most so-called “fileless malware” does contain information, in all probability various information in its operation…
…however there will likely be a key level at which one thing you would possibly detect *solely exists in reminiscence*.
So, safety software program that’s solely capable of monitor disk entry will miss out.
How do you cope with that type of scenario, the place the crooks have gotten all this semi-suspicious stuff, after which they’ve disguised the actually harmful bit with this fileless, memory-only trick?
How do you cope with that?
FRASER. One of many methods we cope with that, notably with regard to PowerShell, is Microsoft offers an interface which supplies us visibility into the behaviour of PowerShell.
So AMSI is an interface which distributors, safety distributors, can use to get a peep into malware.
DUCK. AMSI is… Anti-Malware Scanning Interface?
FRASER. Precisely.
It offers us a window into the behaviour of PowerShell at any time limit.
So, because it is likely to be doing issues filelessly… any conventional interception factors that are in search of information on disk, they gained’t be coming into play.
However the behaviour of PowerShell itself will generate exercise, in case you like, inside the AMSI interface, which supplies us the power to recognise and block sure varieties of malicious PowerShell exercise.
The opposite factor is that, though “fileless” is seen as a little bit of a panacea for the unhealthy guys…
…really, one of many issues that almost all attackers are after in some unspecified time in the future is what we name persistence.
OK, they’ve acquired some code operating on the machine… however what occurs if that machine is restarted?
And so their fileless malware sometimes will search to have add some stage of persistence.
So, many of the fileless assaults that we’ve seen really interact, sometimes with the Home windows Registry – they use the registry as a manner of reaching persistence.
Sometimes, they put some form of BLOB [binary large object] of information within the registry, and modify some registry keys such that such that when that machine is restarted, that BLOB is decoded and malicious behaviour carries on once more.
Right this moment’s merchandise are all about a complete vary of applied sciences, from easy, proper by way of to fairly terribly complicated.
DUCK. That additionally helps to clarify why folks take information which might be kind-of the precursors of malware, however not overtly malicious themselves, add them to an internet service like, say, Virus Whole…
…and go, “Hey, no one detects this. All safety merchandise are ineffective.”
However it doesn’t imply that file can spring into life and begin doing unhealthy stuff with out getting stopped…
FRASER. That’s an excellent level.
I believe it’s one thing the safety trade has tried… however the truth that we nonetheless discuss it – we’ve in all probability did not get this level throughout:
What’s safety?
What will we really imply?
What does defending somebody in opposition to a menace sometimes imply?
Most individuals have a tendency to consider it like this… OK, they’ve a menace; they need a file that’s “the menace”; they usually wish to see if that file will get detected.
However that exact assault… let’s suppose it’s a bot.
There is likely to be 10,000 of these information *each single day*, because the unhealthy guys flip their deal with and churn out a lot of totally different replicas which might be primarily all the identical primary factor.
And so the truth that 1, or 10, or 100 of these information will get detected…
…it doesn’t actually inform you very a lot about how nicely a product would possibly defend in opposition to that menace.
DUCK. “Bot” means software program robotic?.
Basically, that’s one thing that sits in your laptop usually, calling residence or polling some random server?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. That server might change from daily… and the bot will incessantly obtain a listing of directions, reminiscent of “Right here’s a listing of e mail addresses to spam.”
Subsequent, it may very well be, “Here’s a listing of file extensions I would like you to scramble”, or it may very well be “Activate the keylogger”?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. Or “Take a screenshot proper now, they’re within the banking app”.
It’s primarily an energetic backdoor…
FRASER. It *is* a backdoor, sure.
And we spoke about backdoors 20 years in the past… I bear in mind doing buyer displays 20 years in the past, speaking about backdoors.
DUCK. “Again Orifice”, in case you bear in mind…
FRASER. Sure, sure!
We have been making an attempt to persuade prospects that, really, a number of the backdoors on the market have been extra vital than the high-profile malware of the day.
What you don’t wish to get contaminated with are the backdoors, which permit some miscreant someplace the power to regulate your machine and do unhealthy stuff, reminiscent of take a look by way of your file system, or modify knowledge in your system.
That’s a much more scary menace than, for instance, a self-replicating worm that simply spreads from laptop to laptop.
That may get the press, and it would trigger issues in and in and of itself…
…however, really, any individual accessing your system is arguably a a lot greater menace certainly.
DUCK. And pondering again to Again Orifice in… what was it 1999? 2000?
That famously it listened on port 13337, didn’t it?
FRASER. You’ve acquired reminiscence [LAUGHS]… sure, “elite”!
DUCK. And as quickly as folks began getting onto DSL connections at residence, and having a house router, Again Orifice was ineffective as a result of inbound connections didn’t work.
And so folks thought, “Oh, nicely, backdoors depend on inbound community connections – I’m protected by my ISP by default, so I don’t have to fret about it.”
However in the present day’s zombies, in the present day’s bots – they name residence utilizing some type of encrypted or secretive channel, they usually *obtain* the directions…
FRASER. And since it’s on HTTPS, they mainly cover that community exercise amongst the million-and-one different internet packets that exit each minute on most residence connections.
DUCK. In order that’s another excuse why you need defence-in-depth or layered safety?
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Clearly, new information – you wish to look at them; you don’t wish to miss malware that you would have detected.
However the file may very well be harmless in the intervening time, and it may transform rogue after it’s loaded; after it’s manipulated itself in reminiscence; after it’s referred to as out and downloaded stuff…
FRASER. And so, to get again to the unique level: how we measure safety merchandise in the present day is extra complicated than it ever has been.
DUCK. As a result of some folks nonetheless have the concept, nicely, in case you actually wish to take a look at a product, you simply get an enormous bucket filled with malware, all in information…
FRASER. Commmonly referred to as “a zoo”.
DUCK. …and you place that on a server in isolation someplace.
You then scan it with a static scanner, and also you learn how many it detects, and that tells you ways the product behaves.
The “Virus Whole” method.
However that: [A] will are inclined to underestimate good merchandise, and [B] would possibly overestimate unhealthy merchandise.
FRASER. Or merchandise that specialize in detecting information solely, for the aim of primarily wanting good in these form of zoo-based checks.
That doesn’t translate to a product in the actual world that can really present good ranges of safety!
In actuality, we block information… after all we do – the file remains to be an important foreign money, in case you like, when it comes to safety.
However there’s a lot of different issues, for instance just like the AMSI interface that lets us block malicious PowerShell exercise, and a program’s behaviour itself.
So, inside our product, the behavioural engine seems to be on the behaviour of processes, community, site visitors, registry exercise…
…and that mixed image lets us spot doubtlessly malicious behaviour for the aim of blocking not essentially a particular household, or perhaps a explicit type of type of menace, however simply *malicious exercise*.
If there are specific varieties of behaviour that we are able to decide are simply outright malicious, we are going to typically attempt to block that.
We will block a sure kind of malicious behaviour in the present day, after which a menace household that has not even but been written – in three months time, it would use that very same behaviour, and we are going to proactively detect it.
In order that’s the Holy Grail of what we do: proactive safety.
The power for us to jot down one thing in the present day that sooner or later will efficiently block malicious behaviour.
DUCK. I suppose instance of that, to return to what we talked about earlier than, is CERTUTIL.EXE
– that certificates validation utility.
You is likely to be utilizing that in your personal scripts, in your personal sysadministration instruments, but there are some behaviours that you wouldn’t count on, though that program will be made to do these issues.
They might stand out.
FRASER. They might stand out, precisely.
DUCK. So you’ll be able to’t say, “This system is unhealthy”, however in some unspecified time in the future in its behaviour you’ll be able to go, “Aha, now it’s gone too far!”
FRASER. And that touches on one other attention-grabbing facet of in the present day’s panorama.
Traditionally, EVIL.EXE
runs; we’d detect the file; we’d detect some malicious behaviour; we clear it out of your system.
You spoke about LOLBINs… clearly, after we detect PowerShell doing one thing malicious, we don’t take away POWERSHELL.EXE
from that system.
DUCK. “Ooh, I discovered Home windows doing one thing unhealthy – wipe the entire system!”
[LAUGHTER]
FRASER. We mainly block that course of; we cease that course of doing what it was about to do; and we terminate it.
However PowerShell nonetheless exists on the bodily system.
Truly, in the present day’s attackers are very totally different from yesterday’s attackers as nicely.
Right this moment’s attackers are all about having a purpose; having a function.
The outdated mannequin was extra spray-and-pray, in case you like.
If any individual blocks the assault… unhealthy luck, they offer up – there’s no human presence there.
If the assault works, knowledge is stolen, a machine turns into compromised, no matter it occurs to be, but when the assault was blocked, nothing else occurs on the system.
In in the present day’s assaults, there really is way more of a human ingredient.
So, sometimes, in a number of assaults we see in the present day – that is typified by a lot of the ransomware assaults, the place the crooks are particularly making an attempt to focus on sure organisations with their ransomware creations…
…when one thing is blocked, they fight once more, they usually carry on retrying.
As we’re blocking stuff, and blocking several types of malicious behaviour, there’s one thing behind the scenes; some *individual* behind the scenes; some menace group behind the scenes, retrying.
DUCK. So 10 or 15 years in the past, it was, “Oh, we discovered this brand-new, beforehand unknown Phrase malware. We’ve deleted the file and cleaned it up, and we wrote it within the log”.
And everybody goes into the assembly, and ticks it off, and pats one another on the again, “Nice! Job achieved! Prepared for subsequent month.”
FRASER. Now, it’s very totally different.
DUCK. Right this moment, *that wasn’t the assault*.
FRASER. No!
DUCK. That was only a precusor, an “I ponder what model of smoke detectors they use?” type of take a look at.
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. And so they’re not planning on utilizing that malware.
They’re simply making an attempt to guess precisely what safety have you ever acquired?
What’s turned on; which directories are included; which directories are excluded out of your scanning; what ambient settings have you ever acquired?
FRASER. And what we discuss in the present day is energetic adversaries.
Lively adversaries… they get a lot of press.
That’s the idea of the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework – that’s is basically a bible, a dictionary, in case you like, of combos of ways.
The ways are the verticals; the horizontals are the methods.
I believe there are 14 ways however I don’t know what number of methods… a whole bunch?
DUCK. It may be a bit dizzying, that MITRE grid!
FRASER. It’s primarily a dictionary of the several types of issues, the several types of method, that may very well be used on a system for good or unhealthy, primarily.
However it’s primarily aligned to attackers and energetic adversaries.
When you like, it’s a taxonomy of what an energetic adversary would possibly do when on the system.
DUCK. Proper, as a result of within the outdated days (you and I’ll bear in mind this, as a result of we each hung out writing complete malware descriptions, the type of issues that have been mandatory 15 or 20 years in the past – you have been speaking about EVIL.EXE
)…
…as a result of most threats again then have been viruses, in different phrases they unfold themselves they usually have been self-contained.
As soon as we had it…
FRASER. …you would doc, A-to-Z, precisely what it did on the system.
DUCK. So a number of malware again in these days, in case you have a look at how they hid themselves; how they went into reminiscence; polymorphism; all that stuff – a number of them have been much more difficult to analyse that stuff in the present day.
However when you knew the way it labored, you knew what each technology might appear to be, and you would write an entire description.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, you simply can’t do this.
“Nicely, this malware downloads another malware.”
What malware?
“I don’t know.”
FRASER. For instance, think about a easy loader: it runs; it periodically connects out.
The attacker has the power to fireplace in some form of encoded BLOB – for instance, let’s suppose it’s a DLL, a dynamic hyperlink library, a module… primarily, some executable code.
So, “What does that menace do?”
Nicely, it relies upon precisely and fully on what the attacker sends down the wire.
DUCK. And that might change day-to-day.
It may change by supply IP: “Are you in Germany? Are you in Sweden? Are you in Britain?”
FRASER. Oh, sure we see that very often.
DUCK. It may additionally say, “Hey, you already related, so we’ll feed you NOTEPAD
or some harmless file subsequent time.”
FRASER. Sure.
The attackers sometimes could have methods they use to attempt to spot when it’s us [i.e. SophosLabs] making an attempt to run their creation.
In order that they don’t feed us what is likely to be the final word payload.
They don’t need us to see the payload – they solely need victims to see that payload.
Typically issues simply exit quietly; typically they simply run CALC
, or NOTEPAD
, or one thing clearly foolish; typically we’d get a impolite message popping up.
However sometimes they’ll attempt to preserve again the final word payload, and reserve that for his or her victims.
DUCK. And that additionally means…
…I glibly used the phrase “polymorphism” earlier; that was quite common in viruses again within the day, the place each time the virus copied itself to a brand new file it could mainly permute its code, typically in a really difficult manner, even rewriting its personal algorithm.
However you would get the engine that did the scrambling.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, the crooks preserve that to themselves.
FRASER. That’s on a server some other place.
DUCK. And so they’re turning the deal with within the background.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. And in addition you talked about loaders – folks might have heard of issues like BuerLoader, BazaarLoader, they’re form of well-known “model names”…
..in some circumstances, there are gangs of crooks, and that’s all they do.
They don’t write the malware that comes subsequent.
They only say, “What would you want us to load? Give us the URL and we’ll inject it for you.”
FRASER. The unique bot operators from 15 or 20 years in the past – how did they earn cash?
They compromised networks of machines – that’s primarily what a botnet is, a lot of machines below their command – after which they may mainly hire out that “community”.
It may very well be for distributed denial of service – get all of those contaminated machines to hit one internet server for instance, and take out that internet server.
It may very well be fairly generally for spam, as you’ve already talked about.
And so the pure evolution of that, in some sense, is in the present day’s loader.
If any individual has a system contaminated with a loader, and that loader is looking residence, you primarily have a bot.
You will have the power to run stuff on that machine…
…so, identical to you say, these cybercriminals don’t should be involved with what the final word payload is.
Is it ransomware?
Is it knowledge theft?
They’ve a car… and ransomware is nearly the ultimate payout.
“We’ve achieved every part we wished to do.” (Or we failed in every part else we have been hoping to do.)
“Let’s simply attempt ransomware…”
DUCK. “We’ve logged all of the passwords now, there aren’t any extra to get.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. There’s nowhere else to go!
DUCK. “We’ve stolen all the information.”
FRASER. Precisely… the ultimate cash-out is ransomware!
At that time, the consumer is conscious, and the directors conscious, there’s knowledge loss.
So, in the present day’s loader is nearly an extension of, an evolution of, yesterday’s bot.
DUCK. Fraser, I’m acutely aware of time…
So, given that you simply’ve painted an image that clearly requires full-time work, full-time understanding – you’re an skilled researcher, you’ve been doing this for years.
Not everyone may give up their day job in IT or sysadministration to have *one other* day job to be such as you within the organisation.
When you needed to give three easy ideas for what it’s best to do (or what you shouldn’t do) in the present day to cope with what’s a extra difficult, extra fragmented manner of attacking from the crooks – one that offers us many extra planes on which we have to defend…
… what would these three issues be?
FRASER. That’s a troublesome query.
I believe the primary one must be: having consciousness and visibility into your organisation.
It sounds easy, however we very often see assaults the place the place to begin of an assault was an unprotected field.
So, you may have an organisation….
…they’ve an exquisite IT coverage; they’ve merchandise deployed throughout that community, correctly configured; they could have a workforce of individuals which might be waiting for all of the little sensors, and all the information getting back from these merchandise.
However they’ve a site controller that was unprotected, and the unhealthy guys managed to get onto that.
After which, inside the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework, there’s one method referred to as lateral motion…
…as soon as the attackes are on a field, they are going to proceed to attempt to laterally transfer from there throughout the organisation.
And that preliminary type of foothold offers them some extent from which they will do this.
So, visibility is the primary level.
DUCK. You additionally need to know what you don’t know!
FRASER. Sure – having visibility into all of the units in your community.
Quantity two is: configuration.
This can be a little bit of a thorny one, as a result of nobody likes to speak about insurance policies and configuration – it’s frankly fairly uninteresting.
DUCK. It’s type of vital, although!
FRASER. Completely essential.
DUCK. “When you can’t measure it, you’ll be able to’t handle it,” because the outdated saying goes.
FRASER. I believe my one advice for that might be: if in any respect attainable, use the really helpful defaults.
As quickly as you deviate away from really helpful defaults, you’re sometimes both turning stuff off (unhealthy!), otherwise you’re excluding sure issues.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. For instance, excluding a specific folder.
Now, that is likely to be completely acceptable – you might need some customized software in it, some customized database software the place you say, “I don’t wish to scan information inside this explicit folder.”
It’s not fairly so good in case you’re excluding, for instance, the Home windows folder!
DUCK. “Exclude C:*.*
and all subdirectories.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. It’s.
DUCK. You add one, you add one other, and then you definately don’t go and assessment it…
…you find yourself the place you mainly have all of the doorways and all of the home windows propped open.
FRASER. It’s a bit like a firewall.
You block every part; you poke just a few holes: tremendous.
You retain on poking holes for subsequent three years, and earlier than you understand the place you’re…
…you may have Swiss cheese as your firewall.
[LAUGHTER]
It’s not going to work!
So, configuration is admittedly vital, and, if in any respect attainable keep on with the defaults.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. Follow defaults, as a result of… these really helpful defaults – they’re really helpful for a motive!
Inside our personal merchandise, for instance, once you deviate from defaults, very often you’ll get a purple bar warning that you simply’re mainly disabling safety.
DUCK. When you’re going to go off-piste, ensure you actually meant to!
FRASER. Be sure to have good visibility.
And I suppose the third level, then, is: acknowledge the ability set required.
DUCK. Don’t be afraid to name for assist?
FRASER. Sure: Don’t be afraid to name for assist!
Safety is complicated.
We like to consider it’s easy: “What three issues can we do? What easy issues can we do?”
Truly, the truth is that in the present day’s safety could be very difficult.
Merchandise would possibly attempt to bundle that up in a reasonably easy manner, and supply good ranges of safety and good ranges of visibility into several types of behaviour taking place in a community.
However in case you don’t have the ability set, or the useful resource for that matter, to work although the occasions which might be coming in and hitting your dashboard…
…discover somebody that does!
For instance, utilizing a managed service could make a large distinction to your safety, and it could simply take away that headache.
DUCK. That isn’t an admission of defeat, is it?
You’re not saying, “Oh, I can’t do it myself.”
FRASER. We’re speaking 24 x 7 x 365.
So, for somebody to do this in-house is a large endeavor.
And we’re additionally speaking about complicated knowledge – and we spoke about energetic adversaries, and that form of assault.
We all know the Unhealthy Guys, even after we block stuff, will proceed to retry: they’ll change issues up.
A very good workforce which might be taking a look at that knowledge will recognise that kind of behaviour, and they won’t solely know that one thing’s being blocked, these folks may also suppose, “OK, there’s any individual repeatedly making an attempt to get in by way of that door.”
That’s fairly a helpful indicator to them, they usually’ll take motion, they usually’ll resolve the assault.
[PAUSE]
Three fairly good items of recommendation there!
DUCK. Glorious, Fraser!
Thanks a lot, and thanks for sharing your expertise and your experience with us.
To everyone who’s listening, thanks a lot.
And it stays now just for me to say: “Till subsequent time, keep safe.”
[MORSE CODE]